Introduction
On 28 January 2016, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court) issued its judgment in the case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname. 1 This case was first submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in January 2007 by eight indigenous peoples' communities, collectively comprising the Kaliña and Lokono peoples of the Lower Marowijne River. The IACHR adopted a decision on the merits in July 2013 and, following Suriname's noncompliance with its recommended remedial measures, transmitted the case to the Court in January 2014. 2 In its judgment, the Court held Suriname responsible for violations of the right to juridical personality, the right to collective property, political rights, and the right to judicial protection, rights all guaranteed under the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). 3 The Court found that it was 'an undisputed fact that the laws of Suriname do not recognize the possibility that the indigenous peoples may be constituted as legal persons and, consequently, they lack standing to hold collective property titles'. 4 It further found that Suriname's laws do not provide any legal remedies for the protection of their collective property rights. 5 These conclusions largely restated the findings in its Moiwana Village v. Suriname and Saramaka People v. Suriname judgments. 6 The Court further determined that a series of activities -bauxite mining, the acquisition of lands by third parties and the maintenance of nature reserveshad resulted in additional violations. The Court's corresponding orders, wholly or partially, respond to the reparations requested by the Kaliña and Lokono and include a number of significant measures. The Court, for example, ordered guarantees of non-repetition, requiring that Suriname adopts legislative and other measures to recognise the rights of all indigenous and tribal peoples subject to its jurisdiction, measures not initially requested by the complainants. 7 Normally, such guarantees are employed to address structural issues affecting human rights beyond those of the named victims. 8 In this regard, the structural nature of the defects in Suriname law and practice were repeatedly highlighted by the IACHR and the Kaliña and Loko-no in the proceedings before the Court. 9 These issues likewise featured heavily in the 2015 review of Suriname by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 10 The Court was also well aware of Suriname's protracted non-compliance with its prior judgments in Moiwana Village and Saramaka People, and its concerns in this regard were sharpened by Suriname's failure to persuade the Court that it had any intention of complying. 11 The former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNSRIP) concluded that this lack of compliance constitutes a 'prolonged condition of international illegality'. 12 In this light, the Court provided a simple explanation for the guarantees of non-repetition:
[i]n cases such as this one, in which repeated violations of the human rights of indigenous and tribal peoples have been committed, the guarantees of nonrepetition acquire greater relevance as a measure of reparation, so that similar acts are not repeated and also to contribute to prevention. 13 The judgment also favourably clarifies or advances jurisprudence in some respects. Its treatment of the rights of indigenous peoples in relation to environmental protected areas, and associated international environmental law, is especially noteworthy. This had a major influence on two recent reports on these issues submitted to the UN Human Rights Council. 14 The same is true for its repeated citation of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), in some cases reading its provisions into its interpretation of the
'IACHR Takes Case involving Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v.
Suriname to the Inter-American Court', IACHR Press Release, 4 February 2014 (explaining that there exists 'a structural problem area involving a lack of recognition in domestic law of the juridical personality and right to collective property…'), available at: <www. oas. org/ en/ iachr/ media_ center/ PReleases/ 2014/ 009. asp>. 10. CERD/C/SUR/CO/13-15, (2015) , at 21 (observing that indigenous and tribal peoples suffer from 'Structural Discrimination') and; at 22 (recommending that Suriname take 'all necessary special measures to address the existing structural discrimination faced by indigenous and tribal peoples…'). 11. Video of Hearing, Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, 4 February 2015, at 1:55 et seq., available at: <https:// vimeo. com/ album/ 3247192/ video/ 118766033>, (where Judge García Sayán, 'echoed' by Judge Roberto Caldas, stated that: 'I must confess my frustration at not finding any response on the part of the State which would allow me to be optimistic that the decisions … in this case are going to be fulfilled because whatever the Court decides is ultimately going to be left to the State to implement, and we are going to have a problem which is very similar to what we saw seven years ago with regard to Saramaka'. He sought assurances from Suriname so that the Court 'will actually have firm reason to believe that the State's statements are not simply a collection of assertions that are not grounded in reality…').
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
A/HRC/18/35/Add.7 (2011), at 11. 13. Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, above n. 1, at 300. 14. The Court first emphasised the 'control' aspect of indigenous property rights 40 in Saramaka People, 41 relating it to the territorial/resource sovereignty aspect of the right to self-determination. 42 It includes various aspects of self-government, 43 including indigenous peoples' rights to internally regulate and manage territory and to freely determine and enjoy their own social, cultural and economic development, all through their own institutions and procedures. 44 UNDRIP, Article 26(2), also recognises this right, providing in pertinent part that 'Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control' their traditional lands, territories and resources. Note in this context also that in Chitay Nech, the Court observed that the direct representation of indigenous peoples, through their mandated representatives and institutions, is 'a necessary prerequisite' for the exercise of their right to self-determination…'. 45 The Court further explained in Kaliña and Lokono Peoples that, 'based on the principle of legal certainty', indigenous peoples' land rights 'must be formalized by the adoption of the administrative and legislative measures required to create an effective mechanism for delimitation, demarcation and the granting of titles that as a necessary condition for reproduction of their culture, for their own development and to carry out their life aspirations'). 41. Saramaka People, above n. 22, at 115 (observing that Suriname's 'legal framework … does not guarantee the right to effectively control their territory without outside interference'); and, at 194 (ordering that recognition of the Saramaka people's 'right to manage, distribute, and effectively control such territory, in accordance with their customary laws and traditional collective land tenure system'); Saramaka People v. (also observing, at 115, that indigenous leaders 'exercise their charge by mandate or designation and in representation of a community. This duality is both the right of the individual to exercise the mandate or designation (direct participation) as well as the right of the community to be represented. In this sense, the violation of the first reverberates in the damage of the other right'). See also CERD/C/CRI/CO/19-22 (2015), at 25 (expressing concern that local government bodies in Costa Rica 'have supplanted indigenous peoples' own institutions in their relations with the State…;' and recommending 'that indigenous peoples' authorities and representative institutions be recognized in a manner consistent with their right to self-determination in matters relating to their internal and local affairs').
recognizes these rights in the practice'. 46 It elaborated again, stating that indigenous peoples' right to property 'includes full guarantees over the territories they have traditionally owned, occupied and used in order to ensure their particular way of life, and their subsistence, traditions, culture, and development as peoples'. 47 The language 'full guarantees over the territories they have traditionally owned, occupied and used', should be understood in the following way. Citing, tracking the structure of, and expounding on the general principles employed in the UNDRIP, 48 the Court ruled that the state is obligated to: 49 1. delimit the territory traditionally owned by the Kaliña and Lokono, 50 which, 'in turn, implies establishing borders and boundaries, as well as its size'. 51 The term 'traditionally owned' should be understood in relation to their traditional tenure system and related customary laws, which must be respected; 52 as must their 'distinctive spiritual relationship' with their 'lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources' 53 and, more broadly, the profound relationship between indigenous lands and cultural identity and integrity; 54 2. those areas of territory traditionally owned which are currently possessed by them automatically become subject to their ownership, control and other rights; 55 3. those areas within the delimited territory not currently possessed (e.g. in the possession of a third party, nature reserves or concessions), but nonetheless sub- that this involves assessing, on a case by case basis, 'the legality, necessity, proportionality and attainment of a legitimate objective in a democratic society … in order to restrict the right to property, on the one hand, or the right to traditional lands, on the other, without the restriction of the latter preventing the survival of the members of the indigenous communities as a people'). 58. UNDRIP, Art. 28 (providing that '(1) Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent. (2) Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress'). 59. See e.g. Sarayaku, above n. 28, at 148 (stating that 'the right to use and enjoy the territory would be meaningless for indigenous and tribal communities if that right were not connected to the protection of natural resources in the territory'). 60. 
Locating indigenous participation rights in Article 23 of ACHR is not new in the inter-American human rights system. 71 Nonetheless, two of the judges considered that Kaliña and Lokono Peoples represented an innovation in its case law in this respect, even if, to observers at least, the significance is not readily apparent. 72 Previously, the Court had only narrowly applied that article to indigenous participation (in Nicaragua's electoral system and, on an individual basis, to the forced disappearance of a prominent indigenous leader in Guatemala), 73 and it had explicitly refused to apply it to indigenous landrelated issues on one prior occasion. 74 Instead, the Court has repeatedly grounded participation rights in the right to property, a right that is subject to an express and broad subordination clause when the state asserts a public interest. 75 It mitigated this somewhat in Saramaka People and its progeny 76 by requiring, inter alia, effective participation, and consent in some circumstances, in relation to proposed subordinations under Article 21, so it is unlikely that this explains where the innovation lies. 77 Article 23, on the other hand, allows for the regulation, not subordination, of political rights on specified grounds, which do not include the public interest as such. 78 A more likely explanation, however, lies in both the Court's prior case law and its adaptation in Kaliña and Lokono. First, in Yakye Axa, the Court held that respect for indigenous peoples' rights is a vitally importantand countervailing -public interest in its own right. 80 In Kaliña and Lokono, it went a step further, ruling that effective participation by indigenous peoples in decision-making is itself integral to establishing the legitimacy of a public interest declaration as well as a right that must be respected in general. 81 It is important to note that this line of analysis is not confined only to international human rights bodies. 82 For example, the Canadian Supreme Court observed in relation to lack of consultation around the granting of oil and gas permits that a 'project authorization that breaches the constitutionally protected rights of Indigenous peoples cannot serve the public interest'. 83 heightened attention required when indigenous lands and resources may be affected, as provided by UNDRIP, Article 32(2). 86 Last but not least, the Court's progressive jurisprudence on reparations in the indigenous context deserves mention. In general, the remedies ordered by the Court display an unprecedented sensitivity to indigenous peoples' perspectives and a willingness to creatively interpret the ACHR to protect the collective rights of indigenous peoples. 87 This includes the collective dimension of harm suffered, both moral and material, 88 and corresponding measures of redress. 89 It also includes the identification of the victim(s) in collective terms; for instance, in the case under discussion, the Court 'considers the Kaliña and Lokono peoples and their members to be the injured party'. 90 Article 40 of the UNDRIP provides in this regard that indigenous people have the right to 'effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and collective rights', which shall 'give due consideration to the[ir] customs, traditions, rules and legal systems…'. This general provision is complemented by specific reparations language found in various other articles (e.g. Articles 8, 12, 13 and 28). As noted above in the context of ACHR, Articles 21 and 23, the Court's approach to reparations is both consonant with the UNDRIP and adds significant flesh to the bare bones of its principles. Prefacing its extensive reparations orders, 91 the Court explained in Kaliña and Lokono Peoples that 'reparation should help strengthen the cultural identity' of the indigenous peoples, 'guaranteeing the control of their own institutions, cultures, traditions and territories in order to contribute to their development in keeping with their life projects, and present and future needs'. 92 Consequently, 'the measures of reparation granted should provide effective mechanisms, in keeping with their specific ethnic perspective, that permit them to define their priorities as regards their development and evolution as a people'. 93 cle 29(1), in its order requiring the establishment of a 'development fund'. 94 This development fund is to serve … as compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered by the Kaliña and Lokono, including 'harm to extremely representative values … that have an impact on their cultural identity and on the cultural heritage to be transmitted to future generations…. 95 In the same vein, in Saramaka People, the Court identified the absence of effective domestic remedies as a key factor in awarding the Saramaka compensation for moral damages. It stated that the evidence demonstrates … the suffering and distress that the members of the Saramaka people have endured as a result of the long and ongoing struggle for the legal recognition of their right to the territory they have traditionally used and occupied for centuries … as well as their frustration with a domestic legal system that does not protect them against violations of said right … all of which constitutes a denigration of their basic cultural and spiritual values. 96 Likewise, in Moiwana Village, the Court identified the community's forced displacement and prolonged separation from its traditional lands as one of the three bases for finding that Suriname had violated the right to mental and moral integrity (ACHR, Article 5). 97 of the territories … also stems from the need to guarantee the security and continuity of their control and use of natural resources, which in turn allows them to maintain their lifestyle. This connection between territory and natural resources … is necessary for their physical and cultural survival and the development and continuation of their worldview…'); and Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, above n. 54, at 177 (stating that its consistent case law on indigenous matters 'has recognized that the relationship of the indigenous peoples with the land is prudence additionally holds that certain restrictions on or interferences with their property and associated rights may be either 'impermissible' 102 or subject to indigenous peoples' free, prior and informed consent, irrespective of any asserted public interest. 103 The same is also the case, inter alia, in the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee. 104 These considerations often provoke strong, negative reactions from states, which assert that this grants indigenous peoples a right to halt national development projects or even, as Suriname protested in Kaliña and Lokono, to undermine the democratic will of the people of the state. Nonetheless, the Court and other authorities have recognised that majorities cannot simply override the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples, even if they do so via legislation that enjoys widespread public support. For example, in Gelman v. Uruguay -concerning a broadly supported 'amnesty' law -the Court explained that 'the protection of human rights constitutes an impassable limit to the rule of the majority…'. 105 There is also recognition of the majoritarian biases inherent in the public interest doctrine. 106 This basic limit is repeatedly referenced in the Court's indigenous jurisprudence, which explicates that stateinitiated or authorised projects and investments 107 'cannot negate the very survival of the members of the indigenous and tribal peoples'. 108 In Saramaka and progeny, 109 the term 'survival' is defined to mean indig- , 44 (referring to UNDRIP, Art. 46(2) -containing the grounds for limitations on rights -and concluding that such 'limitations can be problematic, however, if they are justified by reference to the interest of a mainstream society that otherwise does not recognize indigenous interests. In such cases, limitations can be misused to the detriment of indigenous communities'). 107. Saramaka People, above n. 22, footnote 127 (defining 'development or investment plan' to mean 'any proposed activity that may affect the integrity of the lands and natural resources within the territory of the Saramaka people, particularly any proposal to grant logging or mining concessions'). 108. Id. at 128; accord Angela Poma Poma v. Peru, above n. 104, at 7.6 (States parties 'must respect the principle of proportionality so as not to endanger the very survival of the community and its members'). 109. See e.g. Garífuna Community of Punta Piedra v. Honduras, above n. 81, 167. See also Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, above n. 54, at 160; Moiwana Village v. Suriname, above n. 6, at 101, 102-3 (observing that: 'in order for the culture to preserve its very identity and integrity, [indigenous and tribal peoples] … must maintain a fluid and multi-enous and tribal peoples' 'ability to "preserve, protect and guarantee the special relationship that they have with their territory", so that "they may continue living their traditional way of life, and that their distinct cultural identity, social structure, economic system, customs, beliefs and traditions are respected, guaranteed and protected"'. 110 Additionally, the Court has ruled that states must assess the 'cumulative impact of existing and proposed projects' because this allows for 'a more accurate assessment on whether the individual or cumulative effects of existing or future activities could jeopardize the survival of indigenous or tribal people'. 111 The Court's above-stated jurisprudence is largely consistent with UNDRIP, Article 8, which, in connection with the right 'not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture', provides that states shall effectively prevent and provide redress for: '(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving [indigenous peoples] of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; [and] (b) [a]ny action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources…'. Other provisions are also directly implicated (e.g. UNDRIP, Articles 11-13, 20, 23-25, 31, and 32(1)). As many interventions on indigenous lands also involve constructive removal from the land -as opposed to relocation via a formal process -Article 10 is also relevant, requiring that no relocation shall take place without free, prior and informed consent. Likewise, the UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing identified UNDRIP, Article 7, 112 as a 'rich source for understanding the right to life and the right to adequate housing in international human rights law'. 113 She further observed that the 'development and application of these rights has the potential to enhance the understanding of the social dimensions of the right to life and the interplay between the collective and individual dimensions of that right; it may also prompt a response to violations of rights to lands, territories or resources'. 114 Unfortunately, no further explanation was provided about this premise or the interplay between the collective and individual dimensions of the right.
dimensional relationship with their ancestral lands'); and Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, above n. 40, at 146, (where the Court observes that 'indigenous territorial rights encompass a broader and different concept that relates to the collective right to survival as an organized people, with control over their habitat as a necessary condition for reproduction of their culture, for their own development and to carry out their life aspirations'). 110. Saramaka People, above n. 22, 129-34 and; Saramaka People v. Suriname, above n. 41, at 37. 111. Saramaka People, above n. 22, at 41. 112. UNDRIP, Art. 7, reads: '1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and security of person. 2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children of the group to another group'. As a more general point, these and other standards recognise that effective guarantees for indigenous peoples' traditionally owned territories, including the right to control internal affairs and participate in external activities affecting them through their own institutions, underpin indigenous peoples' identity, integrity and survival. There is therefore a complex of interdependent human rights 115 converging on and inherent to indigenous peoples' various relationships with their traditional lands and territories as well as their interrelated status as self-determining entities, all of which necessitates a high standard of affirmative protection. 116 These issues were very relevant in Kaliña and Lokono given the scale and cumulative impact of the nature reserves, mining and logging operations, and individual titles, which cumulatively affect the vast majority of their territory. The Kaliña and Lokono peoples are severely restricted in and, in some cases, denied their ability to preserve their relationships with their territory and to maintain their traditional way of life in the vast majority thereof. This even extends to the core residential areas of their villages, which have been issued to and fenced-off by third parties for use as vacation homes! In its judgment, the Court determined that the proven violations had resulted in 'harm to extremely representative values of the [Kaliña and Lokono] … that have an impact on their cultural identity and on the cultural heritage to be transmitted to future generations'. 117 It observed more specifically that 'the extraction of bauxite … resulted in serious damage to the environment and to the natural resources necessary for [their] survival and development', 118 and 'the negative effects have continued over time, thus affecting the traditional territory and the means of survival of the members of these peoples'. 119 damaged and the landscape altered radically'. 120 It ruled in this respect that the state had violated the victims' rights to collective property, cultural identity 121 and participation in public matters. 122 Note in this regard that, in Sarayaku, the Court observed that respect for the right to consultation of indigenous peoples 'is precisely recognition of their rights to their own culture or cultural identity … which must be assured, in particular, in a pluralistic, multicultural and democratic society'. 123 Leaving aside the equation of recognition of rights to culture or to cultural identity with the right to consultation, not the least as the latter would not seem, by itself, to ensure the substantive guarantees inherent in said rights, the Court could have found that the proven acts and omissions do, as a matter of fact and law, 'negate the very survival' of the Kaliña and Lokono, and therefore, that the impugned activities were impermissible. It could have plausibly done so in relation to the bauxite mining alone based on its factual findings. Cumulatively, the facts of the case strongly support finding that the activities in question do threaten, and likely also negate, the Kaliña and Lokono's 'ability to "preserve, protect and guarantee the special relationship that they have with their territory", so that "they may continue living their traditional way of life, and that their distinct cultural identity, social structure, economic system, customs, beliefs and traditions are respected, guaranteed and protected"', the ultimate purpose of the protections specified by the Court. However, despite being extensively briefed by the Kaliña and Lokono, these issues are not analysed or otherwise adequately addressed in the judgment. The Court, for example, could have concluded that the activity or activities did not rise to the requisite level (e.g. finding that serious and enduring damage to natural resources necessary for survival and development and inter-generational harm to the cultural identity of the Kaliña and Lokono does not pass the threshold), but this point was not explicitly addressed. The redress provided for the 120. Id., at 220. 121. Sarayaku, above n. 28, at 217 (explaining that 'the right to cultural identity is a fundamental right -and one of a collective nature -of the indigenous communities, which should be respected in a multicultural, pluralistic and democratic society. This means that States have an obligation to ensure that indigenous peoples are properly consulted on matters that affect or could affect their cultural and social life, in accordance with their values, traditions, customs and forms of organization'). 122. Kaliña and Lokono peoples, above n. 1, at 198 (finding these violations to have been caused 'mainly by preventing their effective participation, and the access to part of their traditional territory and natural resources, in the Galibi and Wane Kreek nature reserves, as well as by failing to guarantee, effectively, the traditional territory of the communities that has been affected by the environmental degradation within the WKNR'). See also Sarayaku, above n. 28, at 218-20, at 220 (where the Court 'considers that the failure to consult the Sarayaku People affected their cultural identity, since there is no doubt that the intervention in and destruction of their cultural heritage entailed a significant lack of respect for their social and cultural identity, their customs, traditions, worldview and way of life, which naturally caused great concern, sadness and suffering among them'). 123. Id., at 159. serious pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, taken together with the Court's reasoning and other orders, may allow some conclusions to be drawn implicitly, but this provides very little assistance to states or indigenous peoples about the parameters within which rights should be recognised, respected and protected or how projects and investments should be assessed and permitted. This is all the more disturbing given the hotly contested nature of many of these issues.
Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living and on the Right to Non-Discrimination in this Context
Patrick Macklem has correctly observed in this regard that the more specific the descriptions international law offers of what changes are needed in domestic law, the more the intervention translates relatively abstract international human and indigenous rights into concrete legal entitlements cognizable to the domestic legal order in question in a programmatic way…. 124 The Court's approach in Kaliña and Lokono not only fails in this test, it also risks relegating the Court's selfdesignated ultimate purpose (ensuring survival as defined above) for the various protective measures to little more than rhetoric. The same may also be said for equating rights protection with consultation or participation but not analysing or requiring consent; the latter, assuming it is implemented properly, being a fundamentally more effective means by which indigenous peoples can protect the substantive guarantees that are usually threatened by extractive, conservation and other projects. Moreover, this equation of rights protection with consultation generally leads the Court to emphasise procedural guarantees at the expense of fully contemplating and ruling on substantive guarantees and violations thereof. This is especially troubling as consultation processes are often deeply flawed and, if they happen at all, the inequality of arms between states, corporations and indigenous peoples is conspicuous and often debilitating. This focus also does little to prevent future violations as the various judgments tend to revolve around state compliance with procedures, rather than, as Macklem observes above, providing specific analysis of rights in a way that makes them cognisable to the domestic legal order and authorities 'in a programmatic way'. It also results in an undue emphasis on permissible restrictions to rights, rather than focusing on the content of those rights, which brings to mind Yash Gai's comment that 'rights are struggling to stay afloat in the sea of exceptions (and alas not always succeeding!)'. 125 Turning to consent, in Saramaka, the Court held that the effective participation standard includes consent when a large-scale project or projects, separately or cumulatively, 'would have a major impact' on traditional context of highly effective advocacy by indigenous peoples at the international (and, in some cases, domestic) level. First, the interpretation of existing international human rights norms in a way that is more responsive to indigenous characteristics and needs. Second, the promulgation of specific international instruments, wholly or partially, addressing indigenous rights, and within different fields of international law; and third, litigation before international courts and quasi-judicial bodies. 133 The above discussion of Kaliña and Lokono Peoples and the UNDRIP indicates that these are not discrete categories, but, instead, operate in a dynamic state of interplay and, often, mutual reinforcement. This also affirms that the UNDRIP is only one, albeit very important, bright light in the firmament that 'stretches well beyond international legal regimes and into State and indigenous forums alike'. 134 The Court is a leading actor in this process, as is the IACHR, which first addresses and then brings cases to the Court. Its judgments have incorporated, inter alia, important elements of self-determination, including as (inter)related with issues of legal personality and rights to collective territory; some attributes of the right to self-government via recognition of the right to control territory and respect for indigenous institutions and juridical and other procedures; effective participation in external decision-making, including, in principle at least, consent (itself an attribute of self-determination); and ground-breaking collective reparations, including detailed norms on restitution of lands, that strive to be highly attuned to indigenous realities and concerns. While it has a tendency to essentialise indigenous culture and rights, often over emphasising its perception of 'traditional', its detailed reasoning and associated orders are remarkable. 135 The same may also be said for the Court's consistent recognition of indigenous customary law and its insistence that States respect indigenous peoples' 'customs, traditions and land tenure systems'. 136 This recognition of indigenous customary law 'has afforded greater protection of indigenous property rights, which are essential to self-determination, selfgovernance, and continued cultural existence'. 137 While only touched on above, Kaliña and Lokono also illustrates how indigenous rights litigation may -and often should -encompass different fields of international law, always with the aim of harmonising them with human rights guarantees. The Court, for instance, extensively cites international environmental law, reading provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) into its interpretation of the ACHR, 138 and stresses, as a general proposition, that 'the rights of the indigenous peoples and international environmental laws should be understood as complementary, rather than exclusionary, rights'. 139 It is important to note that, although the CBD purports to guarantee some indigenous rights, there is no corresponding enforcement mechanism. The Court's ruling provides an opportunity to enforce some CDB provisions through the lens of the ACHR.
One area where much greater attention is required is the intersection between indigenous rights and trade, investment and private sector operations. 140 Even though many of the cases resolved by the IACHR and the Court have involved private sector entities, especially in the extractives sector, the role and potential liability of the private sector has yet to be addressed. 
